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Seeing the forest and not the trees: When impact
uncertainty heightens causal complexity
Evelyn W. M. Au
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore
T his study attempts to isolate the effects of experiencing uncertainty on people’s cognitive processes. I argue that peoplecan believe that their actions affect the outcome (i.e. outcome control), but still face uncertainty regarding the extent
to which actions will make a difference (i.e. impact uncertainty). To this end, I introduce a novel experimental paradigm
which isolates the effects of impact uncertainty from outcome control. The findings revealed that after experiencing
impact uncertainty, participants demonstrated greater causal complexity (i.e. more likely to make situational attributions
and judge outcomes as having a “ripple effect”), but did not make fewer effort attributions for the outcomes. These findings
demonstrate how the experience of impact uncertainty can affect cognitive processing, without compromising outcome
control. Implications of these findings for developing more nuanced theories on control and uncertainty are discussed.
Keywords: Uncertainty; Outcome control; Perceived control; Causal complexity.
Numerous world events are challenging individuals’
perceived ability to shape experienced outcomes: the
widening gap of income inequality worldwide has con-
tributed to beliefs that upward mobility is a dream of the
past. Although circumstances casts doubts over the extent
to which people can actually be upwardly mobile, people
still believe that their actions can make a difference to the
outcome (referred to as outcome control; Skinner, 1996).
For example, people know that working harder would
improve their socio-economic status, but the extent to
which their actions will matter is uncertain. I refer to
this experience as impact uncertainty. Despite facing
uncertainties, existing research suggests individuals do
not decrease their efforts in trying to control outcomes
(Au et al., 2011; Converse, Risen, & Carter, 2012). The
current literature on control has mostly focused on the
presence (or absence) in the link between actions and
outcomes, and thus far, no research has examined the
impact of experiencing uncertainty despite knowing that
their actions can impact the outcome. This study was
designed to fill this theoretical gap by examining how
impact uncertainty affects cognitive processing.
Outcome control and impact uncertainty
The constructs of control are varied in their definitions,
but they largely focus on individuals’ beliefs about
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whether actions determine outcomes (Skinner, 1996).
Consequently, experimental manipulations of control
employed paradigms where individuals’ actions either
determined outcomes or they did not (e.g. Pittman &
Pittman, 1979; Zhou, Le, Lao, & Baumeister, 2012).
Converse et al.’s Study 3 (Converse et al., 2012) offered
evidence that impact uncertainty and outcome control
as separate constructs. This study used a sample of job
seekers who were all facing impact uncertainty, they
demonstrated that only those who felt that the outcomes
of their job search were outside of their control were
most likely to attempt to gain fate’s favour through char-
ity pledges. This finding suggests that individuals can
experience impact uncertainty and still belief in outcome
control.
Causal complexity
Causal complexity is amalgamation of outcomes that
imply the consideration of “the big picture,” such as
making greater situational attributions for specific events
(Morris & Peng, 1994), and being more cognizant of
the “ripple effect” of a particular event (Maddux &
Yuki, 2006). The relationship between outcome control
and causal complexity is complicated: past research sug-
gests that when people experience brief experience with
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outcome control deprivation, they shift to a more ana-
lytical (rather than holistic) thinking style to reassert
their sense of control. However, after the experience of
prolonged outcome control deprivation, they shift back
towards focusing on “big picture” by displaying a holis-
tic thinking style (Zhou et al., 2012). Given that people
who face impact uncertainty can still have outcome con-
trol, this research extends upon past research by attempt-
ing to isolate the effects of impact uncertainty on causal
complexity.
Study overview and hypotheses
To this end, the current study manipulates impact uncer-
tainty while keeping outcome control constant across the
conditions. The study was designed with three key fac-
tors in mind: (a) The actual amount of control participants
have over their outcomes is the same across both condi-
tions (i.e. the objective conditions of outcome control), (b)
Participants perceive that their actions can change their
outcomes to the same degree across conditions (i.e. the
perceived levels of outcome control), and (c) The only
difference between the conditions is the degree of uncer-
tainty in the role of their actions in determining their per-
formance (i.e. impact uncertainty).
When people face impact uncertainty, they become
cognizant of factors others than their personal actions
determine outcomes, and highlights how a complex
system of factors may work in concert to determine
outcomes. As a consequence, it stands to reason that
the experience of impact uncertainty (vs. impact cer-
tainty) will lead people to focus on the “big picture,”
by attributing outcomes to a larger number of factors as
a consequence (Hypothesis 1a), and expecting a larger
“ripple effect” of this event (Hypothesis 1b). Although the
experience of impact uncertainty is expected to heighten
causal complexity, people still experience outcome con-
trol in this study. Therefore, attributions of the event to
effort should not differ across conditions (Hypothesis 2).
Theoretical implications
There are two important theoretical implications for the
study of control and uncertainty if the results pan out
as hypothesised. First, the results will demonstrate that a
shift to holistic thinking does not always mean that indi-
viduals are relinquishing outcome control (as suggested
by the findings the prolonged outcome deprivation stud-
ies in Zhou et al., 2012). Instead, people can display a
holistic thinking style, without compromising the belief
that their efforts can shape outcomes. Second, given the
unique effects of impact uncertainty on causal complexity,
1Even when the data from these two participants were included, all the reported results were still the significant and in the same direction.
the findings will suggest that the experience of uncertainty
deserves its own space in the literature and should not be
subsumed under the construct of outcome control.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 60 participants took part in the study for a pay-
ment of $8 and a bonus depending on their performance
on the Dictator Game. Two of the participants expressed
doubts as to whether they were playing with a real part-
ner and were therefore excluded from all of the analyses1.
Of the final sample of 58 participants, 74% were females
with a mean age of 21.7 years (SD= 2.02).
Procedures
Overview
Participants took part in the study in groups of four.
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were seated in four
separate sound-proof rooms. Participants then read the
instructions of the Dictator Game and completed their
resource allocations online. Once the participant com-
pleted the Dictator Game, the experimenter activated the
questionnaire containing the dependent measures on the
computer.
Manipulation
Participants played a 10-trial version of Dictator Game.
On each trial, either the participant or their partner was the
allocator (i.e. the person who split the pot between them).
Once the allocator made his/her decision, the receiver
learned of the allocation before moving onto the next trial.
Participants were told that they were randomly selected to
play with one of the other participants from that session.
However, in reality, the game was fixed such that partici-
pants’ (fictitious) partner was always fair in the allocation
(i.e. always allocating participants 50% of the pot).
Owing to the nature of the Dictator Game, participants
should experience largest amount of control on trials
where they were allocators compared to trials where
they were receivers. Therefore, knowing ahead of time
the number of trials on which they will be allocators
and when they will be allocators creates a greater sense
of certainty regarding their performance in the game.
Therefore, participants in the certainty condition were
told at the beginning of the game on which trials they have
been randomly assigned to be the allocator. Participants in
the uncertainty condition were told that the computer will
© 2015 International Union of Psychological Science
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randomly assignwho is to be the allocator at the beginning
of each trial. All participants were the allocator on Trials
1, 3, 5, 6 and 8.
Attributions and consequences
After participants completed the resource allocation
task, they were given eight scenarios to read. In each sce-
nario, the protagonist either experienced a positive out-
come or a negative outcome in one of four domains (i.e.
education, investment, relationship and health). Partici-
pants were given a list of possible explanations for each
outcome and were asked to rate how likely it is that each
factor played a role from 0 (this factor is does not have any
effect on the outcome) to 100 (this factor has an extremely
large effect on the outcome). These explanations either
contained effort-related factors or situational factors, as
being responsible for the success/failure. The order of pre-
sentation for the scenarios and the order of the different
explanations within each scenario were both randomised
by the computer. Composites for effort-related explana-
tions ratings (α= .95; 40 items) and situational explana-
tion ratings were created (α= .85; 32 items) by averaging
ratings on the two types of explanations across all the
scenarios.
In addition to the attribution ratings, participants were
also asked to make three judgments on the long-term
effects of the outcome. For each scenario, participants
were also asked to indicate the extent to which they
believe that the outcomewould affect protagonist’s future.
The ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale from 1
(extremely small extent) to 7 (extremely large extent). A
composite score was created by taking the mean of all the
future judgement items across all the scenarios (α= .81;
24 items).
RESULTS
Given that the sample sizes reported were relatively small,
all of the reported analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were
conducted on bias-corrected means, using the bootstrap-
ping method with replacement. In each analysis, the




A manipulation check on impact uncertainty could
not be carried out in the main study for two reasons:
(a) If a question regarding uncertainty was posed right
2Mean age= 32.8, SD= 9.8; 21 females, 28 males, one did not report gender.
after the instructions, it would draw participants’ atten-
tion to the experience of uncertainty, thereby potentially
altering their experience and (b) If a question regarding
uncertainty was posed after the game was finished, par-
ticipants’ experiences of uncertainty have already been
resolved, and no differences would be expected. There-
fore, to test whether impact uncertainty differed across
conditions, a pilot test was conducted. Fifty2 partici-
pants were recruited fromAmazon’smTurks platform and
shown the instructions to the game. Participants either
read that they will be the allocator on Trials 1, 3, 5, 6 and
8 (certainty condition) or read that they will learn at the
beginning of each trial whether they will be the alloca-
tor on that trial (uncertainty condition). Participants were
then asked: “At this moment in time, do you know for cer-
tain onwhich trials youwill be the allocator?” Participants
responded on a 10-point scale from 1 (completely uncer-
tain) to 10 (completely certain). The one-way ANOVA
conducted on the biased-corrected means suggested that
participants’ experience of impact uncertainty differed
across conditions, F(1, 48)= 112.88, p< .001; 95% con-
fidence interval (CI) MUncertainty = 1.74–3.72 (SE= .50);
95% CI MCertainty = 8.50–9.93 (SE= .37).
Outcome control
To ensure that outcome control did not differ across
conditions, participants in the main study were asked
two questions regarding how much control they had over
their performance outcomes. The two questions were:
“To what extent did you have control over your perfor-
mance in the game?” and “To what extend did your per-
formance depend on your partner?” The second question
was reversed scored, and the mean of both questions was
used as the manipulation check on control. Participants
responded on a 7-point scale, with 1(strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree). The one-way ANOVA conducted
on the biased-corrected means suggested that perceived
control did not differ across conditions, F(1, 56)= .55,
p= .46; 95% CI MUncertainty = 4.29–5.00 (SE= .18); 95%
CI MCertainty = 4.09–4.75 (SE= .16).
Dependent measures
We first tested whether the valence of the outcome had an
effect on the judgements. A repeated-measures ANOVAs
revealed that there were no differences in external attribu-
tions, ripple effects, or effort attributions between the sce-
narios with positive outcomes versus negative outcomes
(Fs< 1.00; ps> .36). Therefore, all the dependent mea-
sures reported below consist of averages across all eight
scenarios.
© 2015 International Union of Psychological Science
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External attributions
A one-way ANOVA on the biased-corrected means
was conducted to test Hypothesis 1a that participants
in the uncertainty condition would make more exter-
nal attributions compared to the certainty condition. The
results supported the hypothesis, F(1, 58)= 5.60, p= .02;
95% CI MUncertainty = 7.39–7.98 (SE= .14); 95% C.I.
MCertainty = 6.61–7.44 (SE= .21).
Ripple effects
A one-way ANOVA on the biased-corrected was
conducted to test Hypothesis 1b that participants in
the uncertainty condition would perceive a larger rip-
ple effect compared to the certainty condition. The
results supported the hypothesis, F(1, 56)= 5.00, p= .03;
95% CI MUncertainty = 4.40–4.77 (SE= .10); 95% CI
MCertainty = 4.05–4.48 (SE= .11).
Effort
To demonstrate that participants’ perception that
personal actions still matter did not differ across the
conditions, a one-way ANOVA on the biased-corrected
means was conducted to test Hypothesis 2. The results
support the hypothesis that there is no difference in
effort attributions between the uncertainty condi-
tion and certainty condition, F(1, 58)= 1.66, p= .20;
95% CI MUncertainty = 8.01–8.86 (SE= .20); 95% CI
MCertainty = 7.77–8.49 (SE= .19).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Past research has largely focused on differentiating
between the effects of lacking (or possessing) outcome
control on dependent variables (e.g. Whitson & Galinsky,
2008; Zhou et al., 2012). The results of this study demon-
strate the unique effects of impact uncertainty—where
individuals have outcome control, but the extent to which
their actions can shape outcomes is uncertain. Although
participants who faced impact uncertainty (vs. impact
certainty) displayed a stronger holistic thinking style,
their beliefs that effort can make a difference in the
outcome were not compromised.
Theoretical implications
Despite its ubiquity, the experience of impact uncertainty
has been largely neglected in the literature. The results
of this study suggest that impact uncertainty is a unique
situation that does not map directly onto outcome con-
trol deprivation. Although participants who faced impact
uncertainty displayed stronger holistic thinking (consis-
tent with those who faced prolonged outcome control
deprivation; Zhou et al., 2012), they did not relinquish
outcome control (consistent with Converse et al.’s, 2012
findings).
Therefore, to refine theories on control and uncertainty,
it is important to distinguish between the two constructs.
More specifically, the belief that underlies the lack out-
come control is very different from the belief that under-
lies impact uncertainty. While the lack of outcome control
suggests that no matter how hard individuals work, they
will not be able to change their circumstances; the expe-
rience of impact uncertainty suggests that one’s efforts
can make a difference on the outcome, but the extent of
the impact is unknown. This differentiation would help
researchers make nuanced predictions, depending on the
type of experience that is examined.
Limitations and future directions
There are two limitations to this studies that future
research may wish to address. First, the lack of difference
in the effort attributions could be due to the ceiling effect;
and therefore, future studies may wish to use a different
measure of effort to see if these findings can be replicated
if the ceiling effect is removed. Second, this study only
examined one main dependent measure: causal complex-
ity; and therefore, future studies may wish to examine
whether uncertainty would affect other types of cogni-
tive processes, such as the use of heuristics. I speculate
that impact uncertainty may reduce the use of heuristics
because consistent with the findings of this study, people
may wish to assess the “big picture” rather than to use
mental shortcuts.
Another line of future research can examine how dif-
ferent control beliefs would impact people’s ability to tol-
erate impact uncertainty, exploring dependent variables
such as optimism and persistence. The factors to which
people attribute their outcomes would be important to
examine, such as internal locus of control (i.e. believ-
ing that personal actions solely determine outcomes),
external locus of control (i.e. believing that external fac-
tors solely determine outcomes (Levenson, 1973; Rotter,
1966), and negotiable fate (i.e. believing that outcomes
are co-determined by personal actions and external factors
(Au et al., 2011, 2012). I hypothesise that neither internal
nor external locus of control would be beneficial to peo-
ple’s tolerance of impact uncertainty. The rationale is that
impact uncertainty challenges people’s internal locus of
control, while the belief in external locus of control will
increase people’s anxiety when faced with impact uncer-
tainty. In contrast, negotiable fate is expected to be the
most beneficial for coping with impact uncertainty. By
acknowledging that external factors play a role in deter-
mining outcomes, people can make peace with undesir-
able outcomes without being burdened by self-blame; and
by believing that personal actions also make a difference
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helps people maintain a sense of control despite facing
impact uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
This study explores how impact uncertainty shapes causal
complexity, despite the presence of outcome control. This
study offers preliminary evidence that impact uncertainty
and outcome control are independent constructs. More
specifically, impact uncertainty leads to the display of
stronger holistic thinking without compromising outcome
control. Therefore, more nuanced theories that differen-
tiate between impact uncertainty and outcome control
should be developed to paint a more refined picture of
how (and why) impact uncertainty and outcome control
deprivation may yield similar (or divergent) outcomes.
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